Chiara, November 26, 11AM-1PM IJN Seminar Room

Chiara Brozzo

Action in (the content of) perception

Abstract:

My talk will aim to present some conceptual challenges that the activation of mirror neurons raises under the philosophical viewpoint. Such neurons appear to be sensitive to the goal-directedness of behaviour, that is, they encode motor actions as opposed to mere movements (Rizzolatti et al., 1996a; Rizzolatti et al., 1996b; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). This has been suggested by a series of experiments that I will illustrate (Umiltà et al., 2008; Fogassi et al., 2005). As for the philosophical challenges, first of all the sensitivity to goals displayed by mirror neurons in perception leads us to wonder to what extent perception is cognitive, and, more generally, to reconsider what should count as a perceptual process versus a cognitive process (see, e.g., Pylyshyn, 1999). Secondly, it is to be emphasized how action constitutively shapes perception, not at the level of the perceptual process per se, but primarily as regards the content of perception (cf. Noë, 2004). Lastly, it is to be noted that mirror neuron activation belongs to the sub-personal level of explanation, whereas the ascription of aims can be more naturally characterized as belonging to the personal level (see, Dennett, 1969; Hornsby, 2000). A question therefore arises as to what the relation is between the two levels of explanation with regard to the content of perception.

References

Dennett, D.C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P.F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 302, 662-667.

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spring08/cos598B/Readings/FogassiEtAl_Science2005.pdf

Hornsby, J. (2000). Personal and sub-personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction. Philosophical Explorations.

http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/822/1/J_Hornsby_Personal.pdf

Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge Mass.; London: The MIT Press.

Pylyshyn, Z. W., (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3): 341-365.

Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L. (1996a). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131-141.

http://www.unipr.it/arpa/mirror/pubs/pdffiles/Action%20recognition.pdf

Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Matelli, M., Bettinardi, V., Paulesu, E., Perani, D., & Fazio, F. (1996b). Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET: 1. Observation versus execution. Experimental Brain Research, 111, 246–252.

Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2006). So quel che fai. Il cervello che agisce e i neuroni specchio. Raffaello Cortina, Milano. Eng. tr.: Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions. Oxford University Press: Oxford (2008).

Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The Functional Role of the Parieto-frontal Mirror Circuit: Interpretations and Misinterpretations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience  11, 264-274.

Umiltà, M.A., Escola, L., Intskirveli, I., Grammont, F., Rochat , M., Caruana, F., Jezzini, A., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2008). How pliers become fingers in the monkey motor system. Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences.

http://www.pnas.org/content/105/6/2209.full.pdf+html

Sam's paper

Sam Wilkinson's paper is on http://groups.google.com/group/nicodoc3

Sam on Capgras delusion

Sam Wilkinson, Monday November 15, 3PM-5PM, IJN Meeting Room

DD on self Capgras Delusion

Egocentric judgements, encyclopaedic beliefs, and delusional assertions

Abstract:
Capgras delusion is often, rather ambiguously as we shall see, described as the delusion that “a loved one has been replaced by an impostor”. Patients suffering from this (in cases caused by brain-damage, which do not occur in the context of schizophrenia) don’t necessarily exhibit any overall reasoning deficit, and when kept away from the so-called impostor, have been known to lead ordinary lives. Any theory of belief has to explain how this delusion, which is highly tenacious, can be maintained among a set of conflicting beliefs within the mind of a seemingly rational subject. Some have held that such delusions exhibit a functional role that is so different from that exhibited by beliefs that it forces us to claim that they are not really beliefs (Currie 2000, Currie and Jureidini 2001, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Egan 2009). I think this is too quick. Here I present an overlooked distinction between encyclopaedic beliefs and egocentric judgements. Such a distinction contributes to a better understanding of Capgras delusion, and one on the basis of which it is genuinely doxastic. While encyclopaedic beliefs are reportable and context independent, egocentric judgements have context-dependent singular content involving perceived elements of one’s surroundings.

Google group

Please check our google group: https://groups.google.com/group/nicodoc3?hl=fr and subscribe if you want to be updated.

You'll find working papers and presentations. Michele's ppt has already been uploaded.

Enjoy!

Updated Schedule

·     November, 26: Chiara Brozzo (Phd student with Corrado Sinigaglia from University of Milan) Title: Action in (the content of) perception

·     December, 3: Guillaume Dezecache (PhD student with Pierre Jacob and Julie Grèzes) Titre: Une perspective évolutionniste sur la contagion émotionnelle

·     1-15 January: (overlap with holidays) ?

·     15-31 January: Chiara Chelini (Postdoc with Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Tiziana Zalla)

·     1-10 February: Nat Hansen (Postdoc with François Récanati)

·     10-20 February: Francesca Ervas (Postdoc with Tiziana Zalla)

·     20-28 February: Valentine Reynaud (Phd student with Denis Forest from University of Lyon)

·     1-15 March: Delphine Blitman (ATER at University of Nancy)

·     15-31 March: Alison Hall (Postdoc with François Récanati)

·     1-15 April: ?

·     15-30 April: ?

·     1-15 May: Marie Guillot (Postdoc with François Récanati)

·     15-31 May: Joulia Smortchkova (PhD student with Pierre Jacob)

·     1-15 June: ?

·     15-30 June: ?

PAST SESSIONS

·     October, 29: Grace Helton (visiting student from NYU)


·     November, 12: Michele Palmira (visiting student from University of Modena and Reggio-Emilia) Title: Faultless Disagreement in Wolf’s Clothing


·     November, 15 (NB: Monday), 3PM-5PM Sam Wilkinson (associate PhD student from University of Edinburgh) Title: Egocentric judgements, encyclopaedic beliefs, and delusional assertions

12 November: Michele Palmira on Relativism (in logic)!

12 November 2010

Faultless Disagreement in Wolf’s Clothing

Michele Palmira

University of Modena & Reggio Emilia

Cogito Research Centre

One of the attractive features of relativism is the possibility of making room for the intuition that, in some areas of discourse, the disagreement is faultless. Relativism contends that this intuition is possible only in so-called subjective disputes, e.g. aesthetics, ethics. In the paper I challenge these two claims by making sense of a faultless disagreement situation concerning set theory. I discuss the case of two people supporting two different axiomatizations of set theory proving the same theorems about sets. In primis, I describe in which sense the two disputants are not merely proposing two alternatives but really are in disagreement. I secondly explain why the antagonists can keep on sustaining their respective views by showing that the relevant reasons in favour of one party concern set theory in its use instead of set theory per se. I thirdly provide a non-relativist answer to Crispin Wright’s semi-formal proof (Simple Deduction) that given any dispute, either it is not faultless or it is not a disagreement: I argue that the notion of being at fault has not to be taken in an absolute sense and I then account for a difference between an epistemic sense and a pragmatic sense of being at fault. On this distinction hinges the possibility of accepting the upshot of the Simple Deduction, recognizing who is at fault and, at the same time, rescuing a sense in which there is faultless disagreement.

References

Kölbel, M. [2003] “Faultless Disagreement’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104, pp. 53-73.

Maddy, P. [2007], Second Philosophy. A Naturalistic Method, Oxford: OUP.

Recanati, F. [2008] Perspectival Thought. A Plea for Moderate Relativism, Oxford: OUP.

Rovane, C. [forthcoming] “How to Formulate Relativism” in Coliva A. (ed.), Language, Meaning and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP.

Shapiro, S. [2004] “Foundations of mathematics: metaphysics, epistemology, structure”, in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 54 no. 214, pp. 16-37.

Wright, C. [2001] “On Being in a Quandary”, in Mind, vol. 110 no. 437, pp. 45-98.

Grace's handout!

Grace Helton (Work in progress: please do not cite)

                                                 (from: http://kremer-pigmente.de)

IJN Presentation

October 29, 2010

Two Kinds of Cognitive Penetrability

1. Cognitive Penetrability

If perceptual content can be influenced—and influenced in a certain way—by beliefs, then perception exhibits cognitive penetrability.¹ In particular, if two distinct (token) perceptual states, instanced in two distinct subjects (i) have different content, but (ii) result from the same stimuli and from the same attentional structure, and if (iii) the difference in content can be explained in terms of some difference in the subjects’ respective belief structures, we can say that at least one of the token perceptual states is cognitively penetrated. We can also say that the perceptual state type to which the relevant tokens belong is cognitively penetrable.

2. Putative Examples of Cognitive Penetrability

The dolphin case: Where a figure is ambiguous between a naked couple and dolphins, adults are more likely than children to see the naked couple.²

The anger case: Siegel hypothesizes that someone’s belief that her partner is angry might result in a perception that he is angry.³

The color case⁴ Subjects

Elm Case ⁵ Siegel hypothesizes that a tree expert might perceive elm leaves differently than a non-expert.

Pan case. Subject refuse to drink from a bedpan, even though they know it has never been used before.⁶

But are all of these cases genuine instances of penetrability? This is controversial. There are a few common strategies for arguing that a given case is not a genuine instance of cognitive penetrability, including:

The attentional strategy

The judgment strategy

3. Two Kinds of Penetrability

Inheritance vs. Mere Lending

There are two kinds of relations beliefs can stand to the perceptual states they penetrate; these are the inheritance relation and the mere lending relation. If a belief stands in the inheritance relation to some perceptual state, the belief’s influence on the perceptual state can persist even if the belief itself should ‘perish.’ If a belief stands in the mere lending relation to a perceptual state, the belief’s influence on the perceptual state cannot ‘outlive’ the belief, should the belief itself ‘perish.’

Inheritance vs. Mere Lending: Examples

A Possible Example of Inheritance: The Elm Case

A Possible Example of Mere Lending: The Curtain Case

Inheritance and Mere Lending: Definitions

Inheritance (dfn.) A (token) belief B with content p stands in the inheritance relation to some (token) perceptual state S with content q just in case: (i) B is a penetrator for S, and (ii) it is nomically possible that S should retain content q, should B cease to exist.

Mere Lending (dfn.) A (token) belief B with content p stands in the mere lending relation to some (token) perceptual state S with content q just in case: (i) B is a penetrator for S, and (ii) it is not nomically possible that S should retain content q, should B cease to exist.

4. One Reason the Inheritance/Mere Lending Distinction Matters

The Emergentist Strategy

The emergentist strategy is a way of responding to particular claims of cognitive penetrability. The strategy is this: for any putative instance of cognitive penetrability, where some belief B is claimed to penetrate some perceptual state P, claim that the relevant belief does not penetrate p but rather, that P and B both play a constitutive role in some mixed experience E.

The emergentist strategy becomes more attractive if one accepts something like the opacity of vehicle type, where this is the claim that it is not always possible, from introspection alone, to know what the representational vehicle(s) of one’s experience is (are).

The Asymmetry of Inheritance / Mere Lending Vis-à-vis The Emergentist Strategy

CLAIM 1: Putative cases of mere lending are susceptible to the emergentist strategy.

CLAIM 2: Putative cases of inheritance are not susceptible to the emergentist strategy.

Bibliography

Gendler, Tamar. ‘Alief in Action (and Reaction).’ Mind and Language. 23 (5). 552-585. 2008.

Kriegel, Uriah. ‘The Phenomenologically Manifest.’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2007. 6:115-136.

Macpherson, Fiona. ‘Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.’ forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Pryor, James. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.’ Nous 34:4 (2000). 517-49.

Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 1999. ‘Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 22 (3):341-365.

Siegel, Susanna, ‘Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.’ Forthcoming in Nous. Also available here: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/CogPen.htm

Siegel, Susanna. ‘How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?’ Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLV. 2006. Also available here: http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/method.html

Siegel, Susanna. ‘Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?’ forthcoming in OUP’s Perceptual Experience, eds. Szabo, Gendler T. and Hawthorne, J. Also available here: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msKfinal.html

1 While cognitive penetrability can refer, more generally, to perceptual states that are influenced in a certain way by any mental state, for simplicity’s sake, I restrict the discussion to perceptual states influenced by beliefs.

2 Macpherson

3 Siegel

4 Macpherson

5 Siegel

6 Gendler